Cover of Strategic Interactions Between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt

Strategic Interactions Between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt

by Unknown Author

2008International Monetary FundISBN 9781451870220
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Publication Details

Publisher
International Monetary Fund
Published
2008
ISBN
9781451870220

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